Escalating Military Capabilities Pose Direct Threat to Australia
China’s rapid expansion of its nuclear-powered submarine fleet and long-range missile arsenal is significantly enhancing its capacity to strike targets within Australia, a threat projected to grow substantially over the next decade, according to new analysis. A forthcoming paper highlights game-changing developments that will amplify Beijing’s existing strike capabilities, including the integration of a new long-range bomber and the potential to deploy assets closer to Australia via a Pacific military base.
The analysis, which draws on open-source intelligence regarding China’s military modernization, indicates that the Chinese navy is on track to possess 25 nuclear-powered attack submarines by 2035, a considerable increase from the estimated nine currently in service. In comparison, Australia is slated to acquire its second such vessel, a US Virginia-class submarine, by the same year under the AUKUS pact.
Direct Strike Threat Real and Increasing
While Australia’s geographical distance from China remains a strategic advantage, experts Sam Roggeveen and David Vallance assert that the direct strike threat is “real and growing, primarily through missiles fired from surface ships, submarines, and potentially from Chinese territory.” The paper, titled ‘Understanding the Chinese military threat to Australia,’ states that China can already target northern Australia with ballistic missiles launched from its South China Sea outposts. This capacity to strike the Australian mainland from Chinese territory is expected to expand significantly in the coming decade.
“As China’s submarine fleet grows in size and sophistication, its ability to use these platforms to strike targets on the Australian mainland will also grow,” Roggeveen and Vallance explain. Roggeveen noted the particularly striking expansion of China’s nuclear-powered attack submarine fleet, emphasizing their long-range operational capabilities without frequent refueling. “They appear to be on the cusp of a building boom,” he remarked.
Submarine Fleet Expansion and Missile Capabilities
The report details that China’s Bohai shipyard in Liaoning province is accelerating production, aiming to build between 4.5 to six submarines annually. This includes three to four nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and two ballistic missile submarines. The authors project that by 2035, the 25 SSNs in service will likely be equipped with cruise missiles or potentially hypersonic missiles. Such a fleet would provide China with the “capacity to prosecute sustained strike operations against Australian targets, rotating boats through patrol cycles to maintain persistent threat coverage.”
In contrast, the US aims to produce 2.33 Virginia-class submarines annually by the early 2030s, though current production has averaged around 1.3 per year. The US Navy currently operates 53 nuclear-powered attack submarines and hopes to increase this to 66 by the mid-2030s. China is also significantly bolstering its fleet of surface vessels, including destroyers, aircraft carriers, and frigates.
Focus on Capability, Not Just Intent
The authors stress that their analysis does not suggest China intends to attack Australia, acknowledging that Beijing’s primary military focus remains closer to home, particularly concerning the Taiwan Strait. “I don’t think it’s alarmist to examine the scale of the threat through a sober, fact-based analysis,” Roggeveen stated. “The chances of a Chinese attack on Australia are small, but governments must look at capability, not just intent.”
The report emphasizes the critical importance for Australia to understand China’s military capabilities to inform its own defense planning. “Governments cannot plan their defences solely on the basis of what a country might do, because intentions can change in moments,” they argue. “Military action against Australia could occur as part of a larger war involving the United States or as a limited campaign to coerce Australia.” Potential scenarios considered include Chinese strikes on offshore oil facilities or attacks on key infrastructure like ports, airports, bridges, or railway lines as a form of economic coercion.
People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force as Primary Strike Mechanism
The analysis identifies the People’s Liberation Army’s Rocket Force (PLARF) as China’s most effective means of long-range strike against Australia. “In the event of a major regional conflict, bases across northern Australia would be targets for the PLARF,” the authors state. The DF-26 missile is highlighted as the PLARF’s most significant asset, being the sole Chinese conventional system capable of reaching Australia without requiring deployment via bomber, ship, or submarine. This non-nuclear ballistic missile, operational since 2016, can strike northern Australia when launched from artificial islands in the South China Sea.
A notable increase has been observed in China’s intermediate-range ballistic missile inventory. With ranges between 4000-8000 kilometers, these missiles can potentially reach northern Australia. While China possessed virtually no intermediate-range ballistic missile capability in 2016, projections suggest it could possess over 1000 such systems by 2035. China’s H-6 long-range bombers currently have limited capacity to strike Australian targets, a situation that could change dramatically if Beijing establishes a military base in the Pacific islands.
